Basic writings of kant ed: wood download pdf

Kaehler: ms. Here the discussion of the sublime concerns not nature, but an artifact——even if, suggestively, from a certain distance the pyramid or pyramids can take on the look of a mountain or mountain range. After claiming that there is in the act of holding together, or comprehension Zusammenfassung , a greatest point beyond which the imagination cannot progress, Kant writes: This makes it possible to explain27 a point that Savary notes in his report on Egypt: that in order to get the full emotional effect of the magnitude of the pyramids one must neither come too close to them nor be too far away.

For in the latter case, the parts that are apprehended the stones piled on top of one another are represented only obscurely, and their representation has no effect on the aesthetic judgment of the subject. In the former case, however, the eye requires some time to complete its apprehension from the base level to the apex, but during this time the former always partly fades before the imagination has taken in the latter, and the comprehension is never complete.

When considered up close, it seems to be made of blocks of stones, but from a hundred feet, the size [grandeur] of the stones is lost in the immensity of the edifice, and they seem very small. Savary , vol. Savary wanted to compose, after all, a piece of travel writing, not philosophy.

On the contrary, lectures on material from other disciplines such as, for instance, physics, religion, and anthropology also contributed to the formulation of the philosophy broadly construed to include both theoretical and practical philosophy. In the areas of practical philosophy, in particular, in the Metaphysics of Morals more than the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant clearly drew from his views of anthropology.

When it came even to aesthetics and, specifically, a theory of the sublime, other disciplines besides geography gave Kant occasion to present or comment on the matter. The cause is: his soul cannot go through the manifold in order to illustrate it. The question can be re-formulated in terms of the sublime. Suppose, for instance, that in presenting his theory of the free, pure sublime, Kant described the height or size of the Egyptian Pyramids incorrectly, that for instance, he was incorrect by a few meters.

Would this matter for his philosophical account? It seems to me that this would not make much difference to his explanation of the alleged universality and necessary i. If not that, then what would matter? If he claimed that a renowned waterfall was powerful, and it turned out that it was not?

Or that the pyramids were vast and large when in fact they were not? This also appears to be inconsequential. Kant would have just gotten the facts wrong, and there would be no implication for his transcendental account. He could simply cite another example.

These polar seas are at least at present not completely open and ice-free. It seems difficult to maintain that it is. The burden of proof lies with whoever wishes to argue that it is fatal, and a convincing explanation would be due. Thus, it is hard to point to an empirical fact the falsity of which would suddenly defeat this transcendental theory of the pure or free sublime.

The theory of the sublime simply does not appear to be falsifiable like this. But what happens when factual knowledge of the object is essential to the experience of the sublime?

Kant implicitly suggests a distinction between free pure and impure sublimity——just as, one might say, he distinguishes between free pure and impure beauty or judgments of beauty. Thus, if someone calls the sight of the starry heavens sublime, he must not ground such a judging of it on concepts of worlds inhabited by rational beings, taking the bright points with which we see the space above us to be filled as their suns, about which they move in their purposively appointed orbits, but must take it, as we see it, merely as a broad, all- embracing vault; and it must be merely under this representation that we posit the sublimity that a pure aesthetic judgment attributes to this object.

In just the same way, we must not take the sight of the ocean as we think it, enriched with all sorts of knowledge which are not, however, contained in the immediate intuition , for example as a wide realm of water creatures, as the great storehouse of water for the evaporation which impregnates the air with clouds for the benefit of the land, or as an element that separates parts of the world from one another but at the same time makes possible the greatest community among them, for this would yield merely teleological judgments; rather, one must consider the ocean merely as the poets do, in accordance with what its appearance shows, for instance, when it is considered in periods of calm, as a clear watery mirror bounded only by the heavens, but also when it is turbulent, an abyss threatening to devour everything, and yet still be able to find it sublime.

Keywords Kant Categorical imperative process Perfect and imperfect duties Moral motivation. This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access. Allison, Henry A. Google Scholar.

Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind. Orlando, FL: Harcourt Inc. Bowie, Norman E. Business Ethics: A Kantian Analysis. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Chambers, Donald, and Nelson Lacey. What he does not say is that most current research emphasizes blunt measures of regime type while paying scant attention to those elements of liberalism that Doyle himself has been studying since the early s.

If different people use force to secure ends that contradict one another, then this systematicity is lost. The association that matters here is the association of power with univocality. Waldron rightly concludes, with Kant, that only the single authority provided by the state and its law can resolve this problem; even the most well-meaning reasoners acting independently would not be able to provide the kind of sys- tematicity that morality in external relations demands.

Pogge never says that Kant recognizes a plurality of reasonable comprehensive moral doctrines. Elisabeth H. Patriotism and Other Mistakes. First and foremost is the misleading title. Apart from the opening essay, this is not a book about patriotism. Then, there seems to be no need to go further in the CI procedure to show that refusing to develop talents is immoral. Given that, insofar as we are rational, we must will to develop capacities, it is by this very fact irrational not to do so.

However, mere failure to conform to something we rationally will is not yet immorality. Failure to conform to instrumental principles, for instance, is irrational but not always immoral. This is a claim he uses not only to distinguish assertoric from problematic imperatives, but also to argue for the imperfect duty of helping others G He also appears to rely on this claim in each of his examples.

Each maxim he is testing appears to have happiness as its aim. One explanation for this is that, since each person necessarily wills her own happiness, maxims in pursuit of this goal will be the typical object of moral evaluation. Second, we must assume, as also seems reasonable, that a necessary means to achieving normal human happiness is not only that we ourselves develop some talent, but also that others develop some capacities of theirs at some time.

For instance, I cannot engage in the normal pursuits that make up my own happiness, such as playing piano, writing philosophy or eating delicious meals, unless I have developed some talents myself, and, moreover, someone else has made pianos and written music, taught me writing, harvested foods and developed traditions of their preparation.

Thus, we should assume that, necessarily, rational agents will the necessary and available means to any ends that they will. And once we add this to the assumptions that we must will our own happiness as an end, and that developed talents are necessary means to achieving that end, it follows that we cannot rationally will that a world come about in which it is a law that no one ever develops any of their natural talents.

We cannot do so, because our own happiness is the very end contained in the maxim of giving ourselves over to pleasure rather than self-development. Since we will the necessary and available means to our ends, we are rationally committed to willing that everyone sometime develop his or her talents. So since we cannot will as a universal law of nature that no one ever develop any talents — given that it is inconsistent with what we now see that we rationally will — we are forbidden from adopting the maxim of refusing to develop any of our own.

This formulation states that we should never act in such a way that we treat humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means only but always as an end in itself.

Intuitively, there seems something wrong with treating human beings as mere instruments with no value beyond this. But this very intuitiveness can also invite misunderstandings. First, the Humanity Formula does not rule out using people as means to our ends. Clearly this would be an absurd demand, since we apparently do this all the time in morally appropriate ways.

Indeed, it is hard to imagine any life that is recognizably human without the use of others in pursuit of our goals. The food we eat, the clothes we wear, the chairs we sit on and the computers we type at are gotten only by way of talents and abilities that have been developed through the exercise of the wills of many people.

What the Humanity Formula rules out is engaging in this pervasive use of humanity in such a way that we treat it as a mere means to our ends. Thus, the difference between a horse and a taxi driver is not that we may use one but not the other as a means of transportation. Thus, supposing that the taxi driver has freely exercised his rational capacities in pursuing his line of work, we make permissible use of these capacities as a means only if we behave in a way that he could, when exercising his rational capacities, consent to — for instance, by paying an agreed on price.

Third, the idea of an end has three senses for Kant, two positive senses and a negative sense. An end in the first positive sense is a thing we will to produce or bring about in the world. For instance, if losing weight is my end, then losing weight is something I aim to bring about.

An end in this sense guides my actions in that once I will to produce something, I then deliberate about and aim to pursue means of producing it if I am rational. Once I have adopted an end in this sense, it dictates that I do something: I should act in ways that will bring about the end or instead choose to abandon my goal.

An end in the negative sense lays down a law for me as well, and so guides action, but in a different way.

Korsgaard offers self-preservation as an example of an end in a negative sense: We do not try to produce our self-preservation. Rather, the end of self-preservation prevents us from engaging in certain kinds of activities, for instance, picking fights with mobsters, and so on.

That is, as an end, it is something I do not act against in pursuing my positive ends, rather than something I produce. Humanity is in the first instance an end in this negative sense: It is something that limits what I may do in pursuit of my other ends, similar to the way that my end of self-preservation limits what I may do in pursuit of other ends.

Insofar as it limits my actions, it is a source of perfect duties. Now many of our ends are subjective in that they are not ends that every rational being must have. Humanity is an objective end, because it is an end that every rational being must have.

Hence, my own humanity as well as the humanity of others limit what I am morally permitted to do when I pursue my other, non-mandatory, ends. The humanity in myself and others is also a positive end, though not in the first positive sense above, as something to be produced by my actions. Rather, it is something to realize, cultivate or further by my actions. Becoming a philosopher, pianist or novelist might be my end in this sense.

When my end is becoming a pianist, my actions do not, or at least not simply, produce something, being a pianist, but constitute or realize the activity of being a pianist. Insofar as the humanity in ourselves must be treated as an end in itself in this second positive sense, it must be cultivated, developed or fully actualized.

And insofar as humanity is a positive end in others, I must attempt to further their ends as well. In so doing, I further the humanity in others, by helping further the projects and ends that they have willingly adopted for themselves.

Proper regard for something with absolute value or worth requires respect for it. But this can invite misunderstandings. When I respect you in this way, I am positively appraising you in light of some achievement or virtue you possess relative to some standard of success. If this were the sort of respect Kant is counseling then clearly it may vary from person to person and is surely not what treating something as an end-in-itself requires.

For instance, it does not seem to prevent me from regarding rationality as an achievement and respecting one person as a rational agent in this sense, but not another.

And Kant is not telling us to ignore differences, to pretend that we are blind to them on mindless egalitarian grounds. In such cases of respecting you because of who or what you are, I am giving the proper regard to a certain fact about you, your being a Dean for instance. This sort of respect, unlike appraisal respect, is not a matter of degree based on your having measured up to some standard of assessment.

We are to respect human beings simply because they are persons and this requires a certain sort of regard. We are not called on to respect them insofar as they have met some standard of evaluation appropriate to persons. And, crucially for Kant, persons cannot lose their humanity by their misdeeds — even the most vicious persons, Kant thought, deserve basic respect as persons with humanity. Although Kant does not state this as an imperative, as he does in the other formulations, it is easy enough to put it in that form: Act so that through your maxims you could be a legislator of universal laws.

This sounds very similar to the first formulation. However, in this case we focus on our status as universal law givers rather than universal law followers. This is of course the source of the very dignity of humanity Kant speaks of in the second formulation.

A rational will that is merely bound by universal laws could act accordingly from natural and non-moral motives, such as self-interest. But in order to be a legislator of universal laws, such contingent motives, motives that rational agents such as ourselves may or may not have, must be set aside. Hence, we are required, according to this formulation, to conform our behavior to principles that express this autonomy of the rational will — its status as a source of the very universal laws that obligate it.

The Autonomy Formula presumably does this by putting on display the source of our dignity and worth, our status as free rational agents who are the source of the authority behind the very moral laws that bind us.

This formulation has gained favor among Kantians in recent years see Rawls, ; Hill, Many see it as introducing more of a social dimension to Kantian morality. The intuitive idea behind this formulation is that our fundamental moral obligation is to act only on principles which could earn acceptance by a community of fully rational agents each of whom have an equal share in legislating these principles for their community.

Kant claimed that all of these CI formulas were equivalent. Unfortunately, he does not say in what sense. Thus, his claim that the formulations are equivalent could be interpreted in a number of ways. There are remaining doubts some commentators have, however, about whether this strategy can capture the full meaning of the Humanity Formula or explain all of the duties that Kant claims to derive from it Wood , ; Cureton Perhaps, then, if the formulas are not equivalent in meaning, they are nevertheless logically interderivable and hence equivalent in this sense.

That would have the consequence that the CI is a logical truth, and Kant insists that it is not or at least that it is not analytic. Since the CI formulas are not logical truths, then, it is possible that they could be logically interderivable. However, despite his claim that each contains the others within it, what we find in the Groundwork seems best interpreted as a derivation of each successive formula from the immediately preceding formula.

There are, nonetheless, a few places in which it seems that Kant is trying to work in the opposite direction. One is found in his discussion of the Humanity Formula. But he postulates humanity is absolutely valuable. Thus , we must act only on maxims that can be universal laws.

This we think anomolous discussion may well get at some deep sense in which Kant thought the formulations were equivalent.

Nonetheless, this derivation of the universal law formulation from the Humanity Formulation seems to require a substantive, synthetic claim, namely, that humanity is indeed absolutely valuable. The most straightforward interpretation of the claim that the formulas are equivalent is as the claim that following or applying each formula would generate all and only the same duties Allison This seems to be supported by the fact that Kant used the same examples through the Law of Nature Formula and the Humanity Formula.

In other words, respect for humanity as an end in itself could never lead you to act on maxims that would generate a contradiction when universalized, and vice versa. Barbie themed hair styling game. Barbie Magic Hair Styler was the styling and fashion game that was prominent in a period when such game weren't yet sprinkled all over the internet, in a dozen flavors and in so many different nuances. But, what it offered the hair styling freak generally girls with ages of 12, at the most, and the occasional.